


Strategy Research Project

The Responsibility to Protect: Implications for the U.S. Army

by

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United States Army



United States Army War College
Class of 2013

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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The United States has rendered an uneven response to mass atrocities during the past twenty years. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept is increasingly influencing national policy and international political discussion, potentially indicating a more aggressive response in the future to prevent or halt mass atrocities. This study provides a brief synopsis of U.S. actions relating to mass atrocities during the past two decades, discusses the evolution of the R2P concept, and analyzes the incorporation of R2P within U.S. policy. Because the potential for military intervention is increasing in response to mass atrocities due to the expanding influence of the R2P concept, this study addresses current doctrine and preparedness of the U.S. Army to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders in the event the President directs Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO). Recommendations focus on future training requirements and planning considerations to enhance the readiness of Army units to conduct MARO.

The Responsibility to Protect: Implications for the U.S. Army

The United States has rendered an uneven response to mass atrocities during the past twenty years. For the purpose of this study, the common view that mass atrocity crimes include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing is applied.¹ The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court provides legal definitions for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes; ethnic cleansing is often emphasized separately, though it is defined legally within the context of crimes against humanity and war crimes.² Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, Darfur, Libya, and now Syria highlight a number of humanitarian crises that have challenged American policymakers and drawn criticism for inaction or poor implementation of the instruments of national power. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept is increasingly influencing national policy and international political discussion, potentially indicating a more aggressive response in the future to prevent or halt mass atrocities. This study will provide a brief synopsis of U.S. actions relating to mass atrocities during the past two decades, discuss the evolution of the R2P concept, and analyze the incorporation of R2P within U.S. policy. Because the potential for military intervention is increasing in response to mass atrocities due to the expanding influence of the R2P concept, this study will address current doctrine and preparedness of the U.S. Army to provide trained and ready forces to the combatant commanders in the event the President directs Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO). Recommendations will focus on future training requirements and planning considerations to enhance the readiness of Army units to conduct MARO.

U.S. Response to Past Mass Atrocities

Few acts of human suffering in history elicited such an expansive response from the international community as the genocide of approximately six million Jews by Adolph Hitler and the Nazis during the World War II period.³ The outcry against such atrocities resulted in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, viewed historically as the first human rights treaty adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.⁴ The United States, though one of the original signatures to the treaty in 1948, did not ratify the treaty until 1988 due to “opposition from those fearful of its implications for civil rights, those worried about its potential to tread on national sovereignty, and those concerned about its effect on the U.S. execution of the Vietnam War.”⁵ The nation’s leaders have been challenged to respond to several events involving mass atrocities in the years following the U.S. ratification of the genocide treaty,

Famine gripped Somalia in 1992, and images of starving children resulted in the international community’s demand for humanitarian assistance. The United States and international partners commenced operations in 1992 to provide humanitarian relief, and eventually Operation RESTORE HOPE succeeded in bringing an end to mass starvation.⁶ Compounding the problem of famine, however, was the rise of ethnic clan warfare that added even more thousands of innocent people killed by fighting in addition to those who succumbed to hunger. Following the deaths of 18 American Soldiers October 3-4, 2003 during fighting made famous in the book and movie “BLACKHAWK DOWN,” and after “All attempts to reconcile the Somali factions had proven futile,” the Clinton administration lost patience and began withdrawing U.S. forces in Somalia.⁷

The failings of intervention from 1992 to 1994 have precluded the U.S. from taking any measurable actions beyond providing food aid during recent famines in Somalia.

The aftermath of events in Somalia clearly affected the Clinton administration's decision-making concerning intervention to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994. From April to July 1994, Hutu extremists in the Rwandan government, military and militias slaughtered between 400,000 and 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutu in an effort to maintain political dominance.⁸ Besides making diplomatic statements condemning the violence, the U.S. did little to halt the killings. In fact, the U.S. pushed for a removal of the United Nations mission in Rwanda, a peacekeeping force that included no U.S. troops.⁹ Facing widespread domestic and international criticism for the U.S. inaction, President Clinton finally admitted that genocide had occurred in Rwanda a year after the atrocities were committed.¹⁰

While the United States eventually committed forces to end the killing of as many as 250,000 civilians in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, a variety of issues complicated any effective U.S. response during the previous three years when atrocities were reported to have occurred.¹¹ This hesitancy on the part of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) was clearly detrimental to U.S. and NATO credibility in the eyes of the international community. Criticism focused not only on the hesitancy to save human lives, but also on the risk of allowing a regional conflict to persist in light of Europe's history of two world wars. The difficulty of defusing ethnic tensions and violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, even after the intervention of military force, is evident due to the fact that U.S. forces remained there to conduct peacekeeping operations until 2004.

The U.S. and NATO were seemingly more responsive to the reports of mass atrocities and forced expulsion of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo beginning in 1998, though ethnic tensions had taken root in the early 1990s. With coalition forces deployed in the region conducting peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, expectations prevailed that diplomatic efforts and the threat of force would force Slobodan Milosevic to pull back his Serb forces. However, Milosevic and the Kosovo conflict proved more difficult than anticipated, “especially after U.S. political leaders explicitly denied that American ground troops would invade the province. These mixed signals encouraged Milosevic not to yield early.”¹² A 77-day air campaign began in March 2007, during which “atrocities multiplied, and hundreds of thousands more ethnic Albanians fled Kosovo in the weeks that followed.”¹³ Following the air campaign, a NATO-led peacekeeping force entered Kosovo. Fourteen years later, the U.S. is still deploying military forces to Kosovo to maintain a tenuous peace, and the question of Kosovo’s autonomy continues to linger within the international community.

Despite the estimated deaths of between 60,000 and 400,000 civilians in Darfur, both the United States and the United Nations resisted calls for forcible intervention.¹⁴ The Bush administration applied sanctions against the Sudanese government and provided food relief, but these actions did little to halt the killings or lower negative criticism. Current U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Susan Rice, commented in 2009 that “In effect what we’ve done – we, the United States; we, the international community – is to allow the perpetrators of genocide, the government of Sudan, to dictate the terms of the international community’s response to that genocide.”¹⁵ Despite repeated ceasefire declarations and peace talks, no enduring agreement exists today to

prevent further atrocities in Darfur. Additionally, the government of Sudan is accused of committing atrocities during its ongoing civil war in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and “has consistently defied external pressure to halt mass atrocity crimes.”¹⁶

The U.S. response to Muammar Qaddafi’s attacks against Libyan civilians beginning in February 2011 was relatively more proactive than in past situations, despite the unwillingness to commit a credible ground force. The U.S. was one of ten UN Security Council members to support Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, authorizing the use of military force “to ensure the protection of civilians at grave risk of mass atrocities.”¹⁷ Resolution 1973, and the precursor Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011 which called on Qaddafi to do no harm to civilians, were seen as “groundbreaking diplomatic moments” that applied the R2P concept.¹⁸ Despite a lack of support among the American populace, the U.S. established a joint task force and participated in coalition airstrikes against Qaddafi’s forces beginning on March 19, 2011, allowing rebel forces to eventually overwhelm Qaddafi’s loyalists and capture the ruthless dictator.¹⁹ Criticism of the Obama administration’s handling of Libyan affairs following the downfall of Qaddafi is an ongoing debate. Domestic criticism included whether U.S. interests were harmed by enabling the downfall of Qaddafi in favor of an unknown new regime, the lack of Congressional approval, and the inconsistency of U.S. intervention in other African countries. International criticism focused on the legitimacy of U.S. and NATO actions, specifically Russia’s protest against military intervention. The aftermath of the Benghazi attacks drew wide attention during the presidential campaign. The administration’s actions to protect Libyan civilians, however, were assessed as a success for “Libya revealed that the international community can act in a timely fashion

to halt mass atrocity crimes when sufficient political will and operational capacity exists.”²⁰

Due to outcomes of revolts associated with the Arab Spring being seemingly unfavorable to U.S. interests, as well as opposition from Russia and China within the UN Security Council, the U.S. has taken no overt military action to protect civilians in Syria.²¹ As of January 2, 2012, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimates 59,648 deaths have occurred during the Syrian conflict, and that “civilians have borne the brunt of escalating armed confrontations as the front lines between Government forces and the armed opposition have moved deeper into urban areas.”²² It is impossible to predict what future actions the U.S. and the international community will take in Syria, since “Despite significant bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts to resolve the crisis, the UN Security Council stalemate has allowed the situation to deteriorate to the point where few options for a peaceful solution exist.”²³ Advocates of the R2P concept, however, can rightly be dismayed that not enough has been done to protect innocent Syrian civilians to this point, including potential unilateral action by the U.S.

The aforementioned cases briefly illustrate some of the more noteworthy incidents of mass atrocities that have challenged decision-makers within the U.S. Government over the past two decades. In addition to Syria and Sudan, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect cites “mass atrocities occurring” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the “imminent risk for mass atrocities” exists in Kenya, and “significant risk of occurrence, or recurrence, of mass atrocity crimes” exists in Central Africa, Myanmar, Nigeria, South Sudan and Mali.²⁴ It is apparent that

regional conflicts will continue to ignite future incidents of mass atrocity, as well as other forms of human rights abuses. The United States and the international community must remain vigilant for these inevitable challenges as adherence to the R2P concept demands.

Evolution of the R2P Concept

The basic principles of R2P are that state sovereignty implies responsibility, and a state is therefore the primary entity responsible for the protection of the people within a state. Therefore, when a state fails to meet this responsibility and a population is suffering grievous harm, the principles of non-intervention and traditional respect of state sovereignty yields to the international community's responsibility to protect.²⁵

The precedent for international laws designed to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes exists with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948. The Convention defined genocide following the Holocaust, and required individual states to prevent and punish the crime of genocide. Although the Convention provided for the jurisdiction of an international tribunal, the Convention provided no authority for the international community to take necessary action to prevent genocide, to include military force, within the sovereign borders of a state. In fact, "the drafters quite explicitly rejected universal jurisdiction for the crime."²⁶ Additionally, later attempts to apply the Convention as legal precedent determined that the Convention provided a limited definition of genocide, and did not account for other forms of atrocity.²⁷

Following numerous incidents of atrocities in the 1990s during which there "were no agreed rules for handling cases such as Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo," advocacy for expanding the role of the international community to protect civilians from

harm began to grow.²⁸ Two primary pressures merged to form the impetus for the R2P concept. First, policymakers within governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations became increasingly frustrated with the lack of authorities permitting the international community to intervene against mass atrocities.

Responding to this dilemma, then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed in 1999 that the international community determine a means to reconcile the principles of maintaining sovereignty and protecting fundamental human rights.²⁹ Second, people worldwide began protesting the inability of governments and intergovernmental agencies to generate an effective international response to mass atrocities. The expansion of information sharing through mass media and social media has produced a more informed global community on the plight of innocent civilians, and this dynamic has increased the pressure on world leaders to do more.

Responding to Secretary General Annan's challenge, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001. Composed of representatives from twelve different countries, the commission set out to address three issues: "the norm of civilian protection, the political will to act when necessary, and the development of military and civilian capacity."³⁰ The Commission established the foundation for further discussion of these issues in a manner that would be acceptable to the international community. The greatest hurdle to resolve, however, remained the prominence of jurisdictional exclusivity by sovereign states over the legal authorities of the international community.³¹ International bodies such as the UN and human rights groups continued the dialogue leading to the R2P

concept, but progress was muted for several years following the attacks of September 11, 2001, when the world's focus turned to the threat of terrorism.

The next major advancement for the R2P concept occurred within the UN General Assembly in 2005 with the resolution of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. This document included a section labeled "Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" consisting of Paragraphs 138, 139 and 140.³² The UN subsequently categorized the outcome as the three R2P pillars:

Pillar One: Every state has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.³³

Pillar Two: The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility.³⁴

Pillar Three: If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.³⁵

The UN General Assembly further amplified the basic tenets of the R2P concept by adopting the Secretary General's "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect" report in 2009 by consensus resolution.³⁶ This resolution, along with follow-up reports, established an international strategy for the prevention of and/or intervention during genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass atrocities, and crimes against humanity. Of significant importance, by adopting this report the international community formally accepted that the R2P concept outweighed a state's claims to sovereignty. Additionally, the resolution expanded the responsibilities and resources of the UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, first established in 2004, to manage implementation of the strategy.³⁷ UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon cautioned in the report that "Despite

years of study and public discussion, the United Nations is still far from developing the kind of rapid-response military capacity most needed to handle the sort of rapidly unfolding atrocity crimes.”³⁸ Due to regional tensions and the global fiscal constraints prohibiting investment in new military capabilities, few nations possess the kind of rapid-response force envisioned by the Secretary General. As in the past, the United States is likely to possess the preferred military capacity should the international community request military intervention through the UN to counter a mass atrocity incident.

Professor Bruce Jentleson of Duke University warned that “For all the vows that there would ‘never again’ be another genocide, reality has too many times proven otherwise.”³⁹ The focus on the issue of mass atrocity during the past decade, however, makes it less likely that world leaders will be able to remain idle in the future. Although the United Nations maintains the predominant role in implementing the R2P concept as the foremost international body, countless other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have studied the issue, proposed recommendations, and maintained pressure on world leaders to do more. The issue has been debated by individual states as well, and just not the world powers. Brazil particularly has lent its voice to the discussion, proposing an alternative “Responsibility while Protecting” concept focused more on the prevention of mass atrocities than on intervention.⁴⁰ Brazil’s perspective, and that of other developing countries, is that “they fear hidden agendas and attempts at regime change in the guise of R2P, and wish to minimize these risks.”⁴¹ Academic research on the topic of the R2P concept is expansive, and human rights groups remain vocal on the plight of innocent civilians to ensure global attention is not lost.

U.S. Policy Concerning Mass Atrocities

U.S. civilian and military leaders must remain cognizant of the increased expectations within the international community that the R2P concept implies, and thus posture the nation's diplomatic, informational, economic, and military capabilities to respond appropriately. Failure to do so risks further erosion of U.S. legitimacy upon the world stage. Previously, the R2P concept barely entered the national policy discussion. In the Clinton Administration's final National Security Strategy (NSS) in 1998, references to the United States' responsibility to protect the innocent were embedded in the promotion of human rights. The 1998 NSS stated "Working bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, the United States promotes universal adherence to international human rights and democratic principles."⁴²

The challenge of mass atrocities inherently took a backseat to terrorism during President George W. Bush's administration. The 2002 NSS mentioned only that "no respectable government can condone or support" genocide.⁴³ During President Bush's second term, international pressure to condemn genocide and mass atrocities became more apparent, as the 2006 NSS contained an entire section titled "Work With Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts".⁴⁴ Atrocities in Sudan and Darfur were specifically highlighted within this portion of the 2006 NSS, and the administration cautioned those responsible for acts of genocide that "patient efforts to end conflicts should not be mistaken for tolerance of the intolerable."⁴⁵ The Bush Administration further amplified the United States' future stance in the NSS, stating that "it is a moral imperative that

states take action to prevent and punish genocide” and that “we must not allow the legal debate over the technical definition of ‘genocide’ to excuse inaction.”⁴⁶

It was not until President Obama’s administration, however, that the R2P concept became fully apparent within the U.S. national security strategy. Within the section labeled “Sustain Broad Cooperation on Key Global Challenges” of the 2010 NSS, the Obama Administration declared that “the United States and all member states of the UN have endorsed the concept of the Responsibility to Protect.”⁴⁷ The 2010 NSS stipulates a more aggressive stance by the U.S., promising to work with allies “to ensure that the United States and the international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities and genocide.”⁴⁸ The 2010 NSS addresses the use of all elements of national power to prevent or halt mass atrocities, but the administration clearly intended to signal its intent by indicating “military means” could be employed “in certain instances” to fulfill the U.S. commitment to the R2P concept.⁴⁹

It is interesting to note the significant emphasis on R2P in the 2010 NSS compared to the 2006 NSS, for despite the political differences associated with any change in administrations, generally the differences in security strategy are somewhat tempered. One primary factor contributing to this difference was the publication of *Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers* by the Genocide Prevention Task Force in 2008.⁵⁰ Though an abundant amount of international and domestic policy discourse, commissions, research, and other fora previously existed to influence U.S. policy prior to 2008, the members on the Genocide Prevention Task Force comprised an august body that no administration could simply ignore. Co-chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Secretary of Defense William Cohen,

the task force first met in November 2007 to “build a practical framework that could help the U.S. government better respond to threats of genocide and mass atrocities.”⁵¹ In addition to the co-chairs, the distinguished panel included former Senators John Danforth and Thomas Daschle, former Representative and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp, and former U.S. Central Command commander General Anthony Zinni (USMC, Retired), among others.

The task force asked critical questions regarding the United States’ past handling of mass atrocity incidents, lending increased credence to the study as most of the members had been in positions of leadership or policymaking during these past crises. Beyond being a human rights issue, the task force declared that “genocide and mass atrocities also threaten core U.S. national interests”⁵² and that “the U.S. government does not have an established, coherent policy for preventing and responding” to these incidents.⁵³ The task force addressed the challenge of competing national interests and priorities, and were dismayed that “Moral and humanitarian concerns – even when these are rightly recognized as U.S. national interests – have often been overridden by other priorities.”⁵⁴ This lesson is even more amplified today in light of federal budget constraints; however, the task force’s warning that “America’s standing in the world – and our ability to lead –is eroded when we are perceived as bystanders to genocide” remains just as prevalent today as when the report was published.⁵⁵

The task force provided numerous findings and recommendations including strengthening U.S. policy and leadership to prevent mass atrocities; implementation of reporting and intelligence gathering processes to provide better response; enhanced cooperation with international partners, non-governmental organizations and civil

societies; increased funding from Congress to combat mass atrocities; and, most importantly to this study, that “genocide prevention and response be incorporated into national policy guidance and planning for the military and into defense doctrine and training.”⁵⁶ The recommendations of the Genocide Prevention Task Force are apparent in other relevant literature during the past five years. It is clearly evident that the drafters of the 2010 NSS were informed by the Genocide Prevention Task Force’s report, and heeded the advice that the NSS “should state explicitly that the prevention of genocide is in U.S. interests and that all appropriate agencies of the U.S. government should plan and be prepared to act to support this objective.”⁵⁷ The report’s impact is also expressed within the *Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities (PSD-10)*.⁵⁸ In April 2012, President Obama established an interagency Atrocities Prevention Board (APB) to “coordinate a whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide.”⁵⁹ The President acted on many of the recommendations of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, directing the APB to establish operational protocols, to examine intelligence collection aimed at identifying triggers of atrocities, and to develop comprehensive options for U.S. response to mass atrocity events. The APB was also tasked with identifying required military capabilities and recommendations for building partner capacity of regional allies, signaling the President’s desire to possess effective military options to prevent or interdict mass atrocity events.

Application of R2P in U.S. Military Doctrine

Joint doctrine has yet to fully incorporate the R2P concept and the inevitability of future MARO events. Currently, only *Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3 Peace Operations*, published in August 2012, adequately addresses the military response to mass

atrocities, including Appendix B labeled “Mass Atrocity Response Operations.”⁶⁰ The publication responds to the increasing potential for military intervention in mass atrocity incidents, and cautions that “military commanders should incorporate MARO considerations in their planning and operations whenever appropriate.”⁶¹ JP 3-07.3 outlines planning considerations by operational phase, and establishes seven approaches (Area Security; Shape-Clear-Hold-Build; Separation; Safe Areas; Partner Enabling; Containment; and Defeat Perpetrators) to be utilized by peace operations forces during the conduct of MARO; the MARO approaches can be executed independently or in combination.⁶² Beyond JP 3-07.3, other joint publications provide supporting doctrine in areas such as civil-military operations (JP 3-57), noncombatant evacuation (JP 3-68), and interorganizational coordination (JP 3-08)⁶³. A military force directed to conduct MARO should be informed by these and other joint doctrinal references during planning and execution, as the range of complexities of MARO are dynamic.

Army doctrine likewise has yet to adequately incorporate the R2P concept. *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 Unified Land Operations* describes in broad detail the core competency of wide area security, the definition of which prescribes the “application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations,” a critical task for any mass atrocity response operation.⁶⁴ *ADP 3-07 Stability*, though lacking specificity to R2P and MARO, is also a relevant publication on the topic of military intervention for mass atrocity incidents.⁶⁵ The Army stipulates a “whole-of-government approach” to the conduct of stability operations.⁶⁶ This tenet echoes the findings of the Genocide Prevention Task Force, which stated that “preventing genocide

requires a whole-of-government approach that leverages all relevant sources of national power and influence.”⁶⁷ Additionally, *ADP 3-07* outlines requirements for military forces to establish civil security, restore essential services, and provide humanitarian assistance, all considerations for the conduct of MARO.⁶⁸ Lastly, *Field Manual 3-07.31 Peace Ops* provides the best context within the Army’s doctrine for the conduct of MARO; however, this publication was originally released in 2003 and currently does not adequately address MARO considerations.⁶⁹ *Multi-service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 3-07.31*, currently in draft, will potentially address this concern.

Despite the lack of formal doctrine, military forces directed to conduct MARO can benefit greatly from *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook*.⁷⁰ The manual, published in 2010, provides an extensive conceptualization of MARO that significantly expands upon the current doctrinal foundation found in *JP 3-07.3*. More importantly, the manual provides detailed planning considerations for leaders and planners who may face the complex operational environment inherent in MARO.

Current Readiness of U.S. Army Units for MARO and Recommendations

There is always apprehension and a level of confusion when new terminology enters the doctrinal lexicon. This apprehension is a healthy condition for the force, as it initiates dialogue and an evolution of training to ensure readiness for potential contingencies. The U.S. Army is unquestionably in such a position today due to the emphasis in policy on the R2P concept and the introduction of MARO into joint doctrine. More progress is required to ensure Soldiers and leaders are best prepared for the demanding challenges that may be asked of them within a MARO scenario. The

authors of *Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook* correctly point out that that “the U.S. is not fully prepared to intervene effectively in a mass atrocity situation” due to the current lack of specific doctrine and training programs.⁷¹ It should not be inferred, however, that the Army is completely unprepared to execute MARO. The Army has experience conducting similar operations during the past two decades. Lessons learned from Stabilization Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR) and Kosovo Forces (KFOR) operations, and the respective pre-deployment training programs, can serve as the foundation for improving MARO readiness. The Army also has recent experience in conducting operations in complex environments, such as counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. Many of the operations and intelligence processes refined in Iraq are relevant to MARO. The Army’s focus on preparing units to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict is appropriate to ensure adequate readiness for the conduct of MARO and the myriad other contingencies Army units could face.

One of the greatest challenges presented by mass atrocity situations is the potential for the rapid escalation of events which provide little time for government leaders and military forces to prepare and react. The Genocide Prevention Task Force recognized the need for “a reliable process for assessing risks and generating early warning of potential atrocities.”⁷² As previously mentioned, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon identified rapid-reaction military forces as a capability gap in response to mass atrocities.⁷³ The Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) initiative is certainly a measure that can address the concerns of the Genocide Prevention Task Force and the UN Secretary-General if implemented appropriately.⁷⁴ Brigade combat teams and

associated enablers aligned with regional combatant commands must be diligent in understanding the operational environment. Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations provide a wealth of knowledge concerning areas at risk for potential mass atrocity incidents, which Army units can utilize to develop situational awareness. To enable more effective situational awareness, Alex Bellamy recommends the development of an “atrocity prevention lens” as a process to identify atrocity risks and to better target responses and resources aimed at reducing the escalation of atrocities.⁷⁵ Though Bellamy’s process initially focuses on national policymakers who must develop the strategy to prevent atrocities, the atrocity prevention lens is “to be applied at every stage of the conflict cycle,” thus providing military forces a means to assess complex atrocity situations.⁷⁶

The employment of RAF units is currently focused on building partner capacity and security cooperation, efforts which can be beneficial in preventing cases of mass atrocity. However, the RAF units must also be prepared to rapidly transition to a new area of operations to conduct MARO if so directed by the President. Training scenarios for RAF units and global response forces should include MARO scenarios as often as possible; the Army’s combat training centers (CTC) are postured well for providing such realistic training as they have in the past. Warfighter exercises (WFX) should also include MARO scenarios to train division and corps staffs for response to the most complex atrocity incidents requiring higher-echelon command and control capabilities. Inclusion of non-military participants, such as humanitarian assistance groups and interagency partners, to these training exercises is critical to developing cooperation and enhancing mutual readiness.

RAF units deploying to regions at risk for mass atrocities must establish a quick reaction force (QRF) capability with aviation support. The QRF capability is necessary not only to take offensive action against groups committing mass atrocities, but also to rapidly secure mass grave sites or key infrastructure, and to detain or receive custody of key individuals associated with mass atrocities. The QRF must be tailorable for a range of contingencies, and be augmented with medics, legal advisors and investigators, combat camera, long range communications, and joint tactical air controllers as required. Ground-based QRF capabilities are also required to execute tasks such as escorting humanitarian assistance convoys, transporting international experts and required logistics to mass graves, and numerous other contingencies associated with MARO.

As was evident in Iraq and Afghanistan, linguists and cultural advisors provide invaluable support for any military force that must operate closely with the civilian population. The Army must identify capability gaps for these specialized skills, including within U.S. Africa Command's area of responsibility where MARO contingencies are currently most likely. Assignment of military linguists must be managed better than in the past. Military linguists should be assigned to RAF units aligned to regions where their language skills can be utilized best in human intelligence collection efforts, partnership with regional military forces, and interaction with local civilians. The Army must also identify avenues to rapidly acquire civilian linguist capacity for regions at risk for mass atrocity intervention. Basic cultural awareness training support must also be enhanced. The Army has done a commendable job in providing cultural training to units

deploying to the Middle East and Afghanistan; it must provide the same level of support to all RAF units, including those aligned with U.S. Africa Command.

MARO requires an increased capacity of legal advisors than is currently assigned to tactical units. The Army must recognize this requirement and be prepared to augment forces directed to conduct MARO with additional military lawyers and legal clerks. Also, prosecution of those accused of committing mass atrocities can be conducted under international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), or host nation law. Military lawyers must be trained on the broad spectrum of international law implications for evidence processing, interrogation, and detainment of those accused mass atrocity crimes.

Evidence collection is a task best left to civilian law enforcement officials if they are part of an international response to atrocities, but Army units must be prepared to execute this task to the standard required for successful prosecution. Evidence collection proficiency should be emphasized at the lowest tactical level at which security patrols will be conducted. Tasks which need to be trained for evidence collection include site security, sensitive site exploitation, evidence collection and handling, and required documentation. To augment the low density of combat camera teams, military police units should be equipped with cameras and video equipment in order to capture digital imagery of atrocity sites. All personnel deploying for a MARO contingency must be trained on the health risks of operating near human remains, and adequate protective garments must be available in case Soldiers are forced to assist in the exploitation of mass grave sites for evidence. Mass atrocities produce enormous

physical and psychological trauma; the Army must ensure adequate medical and mental health capabilities are available to treat both the victims as well as our Soldiers.

The Army's progress made in dealing with interagency, intergovernmental and nongovernmental partners in Iraq and Afghanistan must not be lost. The cooperation of such organizations will be invaluable in a MARO scenario, as achieving stability in such an operational environment will include reestablishing civil control, humanitarian assistance, and restoring essential services. Unfortunately, cooperation with interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations can be a perishable condition when the military is not forced by circumstance to work with these entities, and vice-versa. Adequate joint doctrine exists to highlight the importance of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national (JIIM) cooperation, but much of JIIM effectiveness is based upon personal relationships. The Army should consider expanding its broadening experience opportunities for officers, specifically captains and majors, within JIIM agencies. This gained experience and mutual understanding will not just be beneficial to MARO contingencies, but for all operations along the entire spectrum of conflict.

Beyond these specific recommendations, the Army's current doctrine and training methodology focused on combined arms maneuver and wide area security appear effective for preparing units to conduct MARO. The recent experience within the ranks of operating in complex environments such as counterinsurgency will also posture the Army well for future MARO contingencies. Still, the Army must be cognizant of the increasing pressure that the R2P concept places upon our national leaders to respond to future atrocities. The debate concerning the responsibilities and legal authorities

surrounding the R2P concept will continue to evolve within the international community. The Army leadership must remain aware of this ongoing debate and adjust strategic planning guidance accordingly. Most importantly, Soldiers at all levels must be informed of the increasing potential for military intervention in a mass atrocity event, especially as they engage in Theater Security Cooperation activities. Given this knowledge, adaptive and innovative leaders at the tactical level will ensure appropriate training methodologies are applied to ensure readiness for MARO.

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